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Creditor Rights and LBOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 This paper examines the relation between legal conditions and leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) in 49 countries. The data indicate that sophisticated PE fund managers carrying 
out large international LBOs can only partially mitigate costs associated with inefficient 
legal protections.  LBOs are more active in countries with strong creditor rights. Club 
deals are more likely to occur in countries with weak creditor rights. Cross-border LBO 
investment is more common from strong creditor rights countries to weak creditor rights 
countries.  Premiums offered to shareholders are on average negatively correlated with 
creditor rights for both domestic and cross-border LBOs.    
 
 
Key Words:   LBOs, Creditor rights, Private Equity, Cross border, Club deal, Law and 
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I. Introduction 
Cross-country analyses of the impact of laws and institutions on access to finance 
and the structure of financial arrangements have been a central theme in many empirical 
studies in recent years.  Under the “law matters” view (La Porta et al., 1998, 2002), legal 
conditions affect both the availability and structure of finance.  Under the Coasian view 
(Bergman and Nicolaievsky, 2007), regulations are comparatively less important due to 
the ability of sophisticated parties to structure optimal arrangements to avoid any 
impediments of the legal and institutional environment.  In this paper, we test these 
competing propositions by examining a market with very sophisticated investors: the 
international leveraged buyout (“LBO”) market.  The context herein is important, 
because if a private investor can arrange contracts and use other mechanisms to overcome 
costs associated with legal inefficiencies, then one would expect that such a sophisticated 
investor would be a private equity (“PE”) fund manager carrying out large international 
LBOs (Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007; Nielsen, 2008; Officer et al., 2008). 
LBO deal volume has steadily increased since 1995, reaching $400 billion in 
2006 worldwide and approximately 20% of global M&A volume. PE investment and 
LBO activities have enormous economic impact, mostly notable in corporate control, 
capital flows and efficiency improvement. Recent empirical evidence, primarily drawn 
from US samples, shows LBOs activities on average create economic value in term of 
improving target firm’s operating performance, employment, patent, and corporate 
governance, among other things (Davis et. al. 2008, Lerner et. al. 2008, Guo et al. 2010).   
This paper examines whether the institutional environment influences LBO 
activities in different countries. We conduct our analysis in three main steps. First, we 
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document the LBO activities around the world, including deal volume, deal 
characteristics, and takeover premiums. Second, we examine the relation between LBO 
activity and the institutional environment, particularly creditor rights.  Third, we examine 
whether PE sponsors strategically engage in club and cross-border deals to mitigate the 
costs associated with weak creditor rights, and if so, whether this alleviates any influence 
associated with the costs of inefficient legal systems.  
Our sample includes LBOs completed between 1995 and 2007 around the world, 
and includes both public and private firms. The data support both the law and finance and 
the Coasian views: legal conditions do matter, but sophisticated LBO investors engage in 
cross-border and club deals in ways that mitigate the costs of weak legal environments.  
The data indicate that the volume of LBO activity is significantly larger in countries with 
better creditor protection, even when deals from the US (where creditor rights are weaker 
and the LBO market is well developed) are included in the sample.  The premium offered 
to shareholders is significantly lower in countries with stronger creditor rights. The data 
further indicate cross-border LBO investments are more likely from sponsors in countries 
with stronger creditor rights towards targets in countries with weaker creditor rights.  
This paper contributes to three streams of literature. First, this paper is the one of 
the few studies that describes the LBO activities in countries beyond US. A 
contemporaneous paper by Axelson et al. (2009) considers the leverage and pricing of 
153 largest buyouts (‘mega buyouts’) worldwide, but do not examine legal sources of 
international differences.  LBO activities in non-US countries have arguably become 
more important over time, and as such it is worth considering a wide range of deals and 
why some countries have more developed LB markets. In term of deal frequency, more 
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than 60% of LBOs occur in other countries (40% if one excludes both the US and the 
UK). Understanding LBOs in countries other than US is important because LBOs involve 
a multiple of parties in the financial system.  Further, from a policy perspective, it is 
worth examining whether legal factors matter to LBOs.  
Second, our study shows how the institutional environment (including creditor 
rights, shareholder rights, legal origin, contract environment, and financial systems) and 
economic development influence LBO activities and pricing in buyouts. Understanding 
the channels through which they affect buyouts has important implications for LBO 
sponsors, limited partners and policy makers. As Tirole (2006) points out, LBOs are 
considered as a governance instrument of the corporate control market and essentially 
create “a new and superior form of corporate governance.” This perspective is consistent 
with Jensen (1986, 2008)’s view that LBOs mitigate agency problems associated with 
free cash flow and thereby help to align management’s incentive. Qian and Strahan 
(2007) and Bae and Goyal (2009) find that in countries with better creditor rights, bank 
loans tend to have lower spread and longer maturity. Axelson et al. (2009) do not find 
evidence that leverage structure has pricing impact in mega buyouts, but do find evidence 
that economy-wide cost of borrowing seems to drive both leverage and pricing in mega 
buyouts.  Axelson et al. (2009) do not examine the effect of legal conditions on LBO 
markets.  Ljungqvist et al (2007) find that US buyout funds accelerate their investment 
flows when credit market conditions loosen. Lerner and Schoar (2005) show legal 
conditions matter private deals in developing countries, but do not examine LBOs or 
creditor rights.  We extend this literature by examining how the economy-wide 
institutional factors such as creditor rights impact LBO deal structure and pricing.   
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Finally, our study examines the cross-country and cross-border corporate 
governance role of LBOs. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that M&A activity largely 
depends on country-specific legal environment and that cross-border M&As play 
important corporate governance role by improving investor protection within target firms. 
Their analysis excludes LBOs. Recent studies use various measures of the quality of the 
legal and regulatory environment within a country as proxies for corporate governance. 
For example, La Porta et al. (1998, 2002) show that differences in laws, regulation and 
enforcement correlate with the development of capital markets, the ownership structure 
of firms and the cost of capital. Our findings contribute to the literature by showing LBOs 
play a cross-border governance role and creditor rights in the home country are important 
for this mechanism to be effective.  This finding herein is important, as it highlights the 
role of legal impediments even for extremely sophisticated investors carrying out large 
international LBOs. 
This rest of the paper goes as the follows. Section II discusses the hypotheses and 
the methodologies used to test the hypotheses. Section III discusses the sample selection 
criteria and provides descriptive statistics. Section IV presents the empirical results. 
Section V concludes. 
II. Hypotheses and Methodology 
A. Hypotheses  
LBO transactions create new private organizations that are often financed through 
a combination of equity from PE investors and debt from a number of creditors. One 
common characterization to all buyouts is the extensive use of leverage in their financial 
structure.  LBOs transfer control to improve firm value by reducing agency problems 
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associated with free cash flows (Jensen, 1986, 2008). PE sponsors often acquire private 
or public firms with about 25% of their own equity capital and 75% of borrowed money. 
Access to credit is crucial for LBOs.  Use of leverage by a PE sponsors improves 
operating efficiency of the target (Jensen, 1986, 2008).  As well, leverage aligns 
incentives between general partners and limited partners in a PE fund by providing a 
governance mechanism over general partners (Metrick and Yasuda, 2009).  Given the 
centrality of leverage in LBOs, one might conjecture that differences in creditor rights to 
be related to LBO activity across countries.   
While the effect of law on finance is well documented in many contexts, our 
analysis is unique and important in that we focus on very sophisticated investors that 
arguably could potentially be able to mitigate costs of weak legal conditions through 
private ordering of financing arrangements.  Under the “Coasian view” (Bergman and 
Nicolaievsky, 2007), legal conditions such differences in creditor rights across countries 
do not play a pronounced role because sophisticated parties, such as those in LBO 
markets, can structure optimal arrangements to avoid any impediments of the legal and 
institutional environment.  For example, sophisticated PE investors can mitigate legal 
impediments to buyouts through arranging club deals.  Club deals have the effect of 
curtailing capital costs and constraints.  PE sponsors need not fund their acquisitions only 
with own capital, especially in large transactions. In club deals, several PE sponsors form 
a consortium and pool their equity capital and debt financiers together in acquisitions. PE 
sponsors form club deals due to capital constraints, diversification, or the ability of club 
to obtain favorable debt amounts or prices. The benefits of club deals will be more 
pronounced in countries with poorer protection for creditors since debt financing will be 
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more difficult to obtain. We thus hypothesize that club deals are likely to be used by LBO 
sponsors to mitigate debt financing constraint in countries with poor creditor rights.   
Sophisticated PE investors can likewise mitigate legal impediments to LBOs 
through foreign investment.  Cross-border M&As help improve corporate governance 
since most of the acquirers go to target countries with poor shareholder’s rights, a proxy 
for poor governance environment (Rossi and Volpin, 2003). LBOs are different from 
strategic sponsored M&As: debt financing is much more important in the former than the 
latter. In countries with poorer creditor rights, LBO targets are more likely to receive 
cross-border PE sponsors, since domestic PE sponsors will find it hard to get debt 
financing while foreign PE acquirers from countries with better creditor rights often have 
easier access to debt financing from home country.  Therefore, we expect to see more 
cross-border deals with targets in countries with weak creditor rights and more capital 
flow from countries with relatively high creditor rights scores.  
While club deals and cross-border deals potentially mitigate the costs of legal 
inefficiencies, we might conjecture that these mechanisms (and possibly others) would 
not completely eliminate expected costs of legal impediments.  Transaction costs and 
legal risks associated with enforcing creditor rights are likely to be nontrivial despite the 
reduction in the expected costs of legal inefficiencies with club deals and cross-border 
transactions. If sophisticated parties can at best only mitigate, and not eliminate, 
inefficiencies with the legal system through transaction structures, then differences in 
laws such as creditor rights across countries will be related to LBO activity across 
countries.   
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In countries with poor creditor rights, debt financing is comparatively more 
difficult to obtain and more expensive (Djankov et al., 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009).  As 
such, under the “law matters” view (La Porta et al., 1998), we would expect that 
countries with poor creditor rights will have fewer and smaller LBO transactions.   
In addition to deal volume, legal conditions may likewise affect deal prices, but 
theoretical arguments as to the direction of this effect are not as straightforward.  On one 
hand, in countries with better creditor rights, lenders are in a stronger position to impose 
restrictive covenants and pricing power on borrowers given the legal system provide 
effective means of enforcing such contracts, which lowers the profitability space for the 
LBO sponsor. This constraint would imply that LBO premiums are negatively related to 
creditor rights.  Similarly, for targets that in located in countries with weaker creditor 
rights, this constraint would imply cross-border deals have lower premiums than 
domestic deals.  
On the other hand, there is evidence from studies on the returns to PE investments 
across countries that returns are lower in countries with weaker legal conditions (Lerner 
and Schoar, 2005).  Returns are lower because countries with weaker legal conditions 
have less liquid exit markets and less transaction certainty upon exit.  An expectation of 
lower returns in countries with weaker legal conditions implies that LBO sponsors will be 
incentivized to pay less ex ante for any given target.  Further, as weaker legal conditions 
increase the spreads on debt (Bae and Goyal, 2009), LBO sponsors may only be able to 
afford lower premium for a given target.  Taken together, these factors suggest imply 
weaker legal conditions are negatively related to premiums. 
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These competing propositions are examined in the subsequent sections based on a 
new dataset described in section III.  Empirical methods are first described below in the 
next subsection. 
B. Methodology 
B.1 Variable definition and measurement 
We measure LBO activities in the following four dimensions: deal volume, 
sponsor clubbing, cross-border, and buyout pricing (premium paid to shareholders). Deal 
volume measure uses log (Total Deal Value) and (Deal Value)/(Total Takeover Market 
Value) at the country level, log(Deal Value) and (Deal Value)/(Total Market Cap) at the 
transaction level. Club deal is a dummy variable, which equals one if there are multiple 
LBO sponsor in a deal and zero if single-sponsored. Cross-border is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the nationality of the LBO fund is different from the nationality of 
target firms. Buyout pricing or premium paid to shareholders uses (Offering price)/(Stock 
Price One Day Before Announcement) and (Offering Price)/(Stock Price One Month 
Before Announcement). All variables are measured in the view of target firms.  
Our institutional variables and indices for the sample of countries are summarized 
in Appendix I and II, respectively.  The key institutional variable of concern is creditor 
rights. It is an index taking value from zero (poor creditor rights) to four (strong creditor 
rights). The index is computed as the sum of scores on four measures of credit protection. 
The first measure is whether secured creditors are able to seize their collateral once a 
reorganization petition is approved (“automatic stay" clause). The second measure is 
whether restrictions such as creditor consent must be observed when a borrower files for 
reorganization, as opposed to debtors seeking unilateral protection from creditors' claims 
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by filing for rehabilitation. The third measure is whether secured creditors are paid first 
out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm or if third-party claims take priority. 
The final measure is whether creditors are responsible for running a business during 
reorganization, rather than having the borrowers to continue running the business. For 
each of the measures, a score of one is given if the answer is yes. Details of the creditor 
rights indices are in La Porta et al. (1998) or Djankov at al. (2007). La Porta et al. (1998) 
use creditor protection to measure the extent of appealing debt claim. Strong creditor 
protection, however, also puts restrictions on firms’ operations while decreasing the cost 
of debt financing.  
We also control for legal origin and investor protection for equity shareholders. 
Rajan and Zingales (2000) argue that legal environment is essential for corporate 
governance mechanism to be effective. La Porta et al. (1998) find that countries with the 
common law origin have better investor protection and more developed economy than 
countries with civil law origin. They also consider the levels of investor protection 
provided in each country, using the index of anti-director rights. The anti-director rights 
is an index which equals the sum of five dummy variables describing the practices of 
capital requirement to call for annual meeting, proxy voting by mail, share-blocking 
before meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed minorities mechanism, and preemptive 
rights to new issues. The computation method is similar to the creditor rights index. 
Spanman (2009) updated the antidirector rights indices by using similar approach. Jarrell 
and Bradley (1980) find that strong investor protection regulation designed to safeguard 
target shareholders during takeovers result in higher final purchases price paid to target 
firms and lower returns to acquirers.  Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) review the 
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scores of these institutional factors for the past 25 years and find this measure is highly 
persistent over time.  
Since access to debt financing and future exit options are important issues for 
LBOs, we expect the development of banking system, bond market and stock market 
influent LBO activities. We include size of domestic stock market and GDP as control 
variables. The financial systems cross countries are characterized by main banking 
system and capital market system. Based on their relatively development and efficiency, 
the literature groups them into two groups, referring as “Anglo-Saxon” or market-based 
system and “Continental-German-Japanese” banking model. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2001) shows that countries with market–based system have more developed capital 
market that leads to better economy growth. In addition to the dummy for market-based 
system vs. bank-based system, we also include the measure of relatively depth of market 
such as ratio of domestic stock market size to GDP.  
B.2 Analytical methods 
In the first step, we document the LBO activities around the world: its frequency 
distribution cross countries, years, and industries. We also document the key 
characteristics of the target firms, LBO deal volume, premium and their difference cross 
types of deals or institutional environment. These summary statistics and univariate 
comparison give us a rough but overall picture of LBO activities around the world.  
We then proceed to examine the relation between institutional environment, 
particularly creditor rights and the LBO activities. We conduct the tests at both the 
country level and the deal level. In the country level test, we first compute average 
volume measures for each country by aggregating deal value of all target firms, then run 
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cross sectional regressions with aggregate country level deal volume as the dependent 
variable and country level institutional factors and development measures as explanatory 
variables. We also examine the relation at the deal level, where firm level characteristics 
are also included along with the country level factors. To obtain efficient estimates of 
coefficients, the standard errors of coefficient estimates on the country level factors are 
clustered.  Clustering in two dimensions, such as by country and time (Petersen, 2009), 
do not materially affect the results. 
 Finally, we examine whether LBO sponsors strategically use the advantage of 
clubbing or cross-border transactions to overcome the disadvantage arising from weak 
creditor rights. We first report univariate tests to examine the creditor rights difference 
between the acquire country and target country.  Thereafter, we use probit analyses to 
determine whether weak creditor rights are associated with higher likelihood of cross 
border deals. Also, we examine whether club deals are more likely to occur in countries 
with weak creditor rights. Finally, we try to differentiate other motives of using club 
deals, to confirm that club deals are not purely driven by motives other than overcoming 
weak creditor rights.  
As US firms count almost 40% of the sample and the US has weak creditor rights, 
US firms can significantly bias our test. Therefore, we conduct our analysis both in full 
sample and subsample excluding US.  In some cases we further show robustness by 
excluding the UK.  Furthermore, we examine both public and private firms, but for some 
cases we examine the subset of public targets in order to analyze more detail information 
available from public firms. 
 
 13
III. Data 
A. Data Description 
Our sample of global LBOs on public and private targets is obtained from 
DEALOGIC, a data provider for capital market transactions. We also use SDC’s M&A 
data to cross-check the sample from DEALOGIC. We include the firm in our sample if 
both data sources report a dummy for LBOs. If LBOs have both financial sponsors and 
strategic sponsors, we identify the leading equity sponsors. If leading equity financiers 
are buyout groups, we categorize as LBOs. We further require deals to be greater than $5 
million1 and final acquirer’s stake greater than 50%. The final sample includes a total of 
2589 LBOs involving both publicly traded targets and private firms completed between 
1995 and 20072 around the world. Among the sample, there are 455 public-to-private 
transactions that involve stand-alone public targets, and the rest involve either private 
targets or divisions of public companies.  
Where appropriate, we adjust LBO activities relative to total takeover activities.  
We also obtain a sample of 4461 M&As that involve non-buyout strategic acquisitions 
from 1995 to 2007. The non-buyout takeovers involve both private and public targets and 
are obtained from DEALOIC. Acquisitions are those for which the acquirer’s assets are at 
least three times that of its target.    
Indices of creditor rights, anti-director rights, and legal origin from La Porta et al. 
(1998) and Djankov et al. (2007) are obtained from Andrei Shleifer’s website.3  Our 
index of the financial market system follows Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
                                                 
1 This cutting-off point is rather arbitrary; results do not change alternatively for a choice of $5 million.   
2 In examining aggregate time-series level of premiums, we extend to an early sample of both financial- and 
strategic-sponsored M&As between 1985 and 1994 from SDC M&A data set. 
3 http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset
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B. Summary Statistics  
Table 1 shows the number of LBOs, percentage of club deals or cross-border 
deals by year as well as the year percentage of LBOs relative to M&As in number and in 
deal value. Both deal number and size increase over the time, and correspondingly, the 
percentage of LBOs relative to all takeovers (including LBOs) gradually increases. Club 
LBOs account for approximately 17% of deals in number but 30% of LBOs in terms of 
aggregate deal value, reflecting that club deals often involve large targets. 23% of LBOs 
are cross-border deals that involve domestic targets acquired by foreign PE investors.  
-- Table 1 About Here -- 
Table 2 shows the clustering of LBOs across industries. Manufacturing is the 
most active industry for LBOs, accounting for 40% of all deals. Service industry and 
retails account for 28% and 12% of all LBOs respectively. We also find that the industry 
distribution of LBOs is similar to that of strategic-sponsored M&As that we do not report 
here. LBO premium is the highest in the Electronic and Gas industry and the lowest in 
construction industry. 
-- Table 2 About Here -- 
Table 3 shows the clustering of LBOs across target countries. US LBOs account 
for more than 40% of LBOs in deal numbers and 60% in aggregate deal value. The 
second most active target country is UK, accounting more than 18% of deals. The other 
active LBO countries include France, Germany and Japan, each accounting for 4% to 5%. 
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The average deal size is however largest in Denmark, second largest in US, smallest in 
Italy,4 and second smallest in German and Japan. 
-- Table 3 About Here --   
Figure 1 shows the average premiums of LBOs for every year from 1985 through 
mid 2007. Notably, both LBO and strategic-sponsored premiums show a decreasing trend 
over the last twenty years. LBO premiums are much higher than strategic-sponsored 
premiums before 1997, except a significant plummet of LBO premiums from late 1980s 
to early 1990s which is attributable to the breakdown of high-yield debt market. After 
1997 LBO premiums became systematically smaller than strategic-sponsored premiums. 
The evidence supports a structural change in LBO markets in the middle of 1990s. One 
possible explanation is in the 1990s buyout sponsors became more sophisticated in terms 
of market prowess, deal pricing or buyout structures, while prior to that time LBOs often 
involved hostile takeovers and junk bond financing. There is a reasonable co-movement 
of premium between LBOs and other takeovers. LBO premiums have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.20 with non-LBO takeover premiums (not reported in the tables but 
available upon request). Figure 2 shows the deal premium by deal size. We can see that 
the highest premium group is in the second quintile groups for both LBOs and other 
M&As. 
-- Figures 1 and 2 About Here -- 
Table 4 Panel A reports the summary statistics for deal and target characteristics. 
The average LBO deal has is 526.47 million USD. Club deals’ average transaction size is 
                                                 
4 In Italy over 1999-2004, the legal certainty of LBOs was in question, and many Italian courts deemed 
LBOs to be illegal (Cumming and Zambelli, 2010).  Our findings are robust to inclusion or exclusion of 
this period for Italy. 
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more than three times larger than non-Club LBOs. US LBOs have larger deal size than 
the deals from other nations. Multiple measures such as EBITDA/sales, market to book 
ratio and enterprise value/EBIDTA show no difference between US and non-US LBOs. 
Compared to non-club targets, club deal targets show relatively lower multiples than non-
club deals, while the difference seems quite small. 
-- Table 4 About Here -- 
Table 4 Panel B reports the summary statistics for buyout pricing (premium is 
defined as offer price divided by stock price pre-announcement minus one). The mean 
and median of LBO premiums are 17.25% and 13.98% respectively. US LBOs show 
much higher premiums than non-US LBOs: 25.53% vs. 12.05%. Their difference is both 
economically and statistically significant.  
Table 4 Panel C shows the multiple of Enterprise value/EBITD and deal value 
between countries with common law and those without, between club deals and single-
sponsored deals, as well as between cross-border and domestics deals. We find that 
common law countries have significantly larger LBO deals, while targets have similar 
multiples. Cross-border deals have higher Enterprise Value/EBITDA than domestic deals 
and this difference is statistically significant. Finally, club deals are significantly larger 
than single-sponsored deals, but there is no difference in buyout pricing between them.    
IV. Empirical Results 
To test whether cross-border deals are effective ways to overcome the weak 
creditor rights, we compare the creditor rights in the target and acquirer countries. Table 
5 Panel A presents the premium difference between cross-border deals vs. domestic 
deals. The data indicate that the cross border deals have lower average premiums than 
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domestic deals. The difference is larger in countries with weak creditor rights.  The 
comparisons with medians versus means highlight the fact that there are outlier countries 
in the data, and as such we consider different subsets of the data in our multivariate 
empirical analyses. Table 5 Panel B presents the results of the univariate test to compare 
deal country’s credit rights. The data indicate creditor rights in target country are on 
average smaller than those in acquiring countries. The difference is significant when US 
samples are excluded. Furthermore, in Table 5 Panels C and D, we show that the 
premium difference between club deals and single-sponsored deals is more pronounced 
in countries with weak creditor protection. Overall, this univariate evidence is suggestive 
that investor protection for debt financiers is important in LBOs, and as such we explore 
this possibility further with multivariate tests.  
-- Table 5 About Here -- 
Table 6 reports the influence of institutional factors on LBO volume at the 
country level. The dependent variable is the aggregate LBO volume of each country 
deflated by aggregate stock market capitalization. We use several measures of aggregate 
LBO deal volume such as logarithm of sum of LBO dollar amount from 1995 to 2007 
adjusted by inflation, sum of LBO dollar amount deflated by aggregate stock market 
capitalization or aggregate M&A volume. In the regressions, the level of LBO activity is 
positively related to creditor rights indices regardless of model specification, thereby 
indicating that credit market development is critical to the development of LBOs. In fact, 
for the specification with the log(total LBO volume / market capitalization), creditor 
rights are the only significant factor.  The institutional setting for debt financing is the 
primary determinant of the development of the LBO market, and this result is statistically 
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significant and economically large: the economic significance is such that a 1-point 
increase in the creditor rights index increases log(total LBO volume / market 
capitalization) by 2.5%.  The effect of creditor rights is likewise significant in the 
regressions with the log (total deal volume) as the dependent variable.  Log (GDP per 
capita) likewise matters in the regression for log (total deal volume) but this latter effect 
is not robust when the dependent variable is scaled by market capitalization.   
-- Table 6 About Here -- 
Table 7 examines the determinants of club deals. The dependent variable is a 
dummy equal one for a club deals and zero otherwise.  Creditor rights are negative and 
significant in the first three regression specifications for the full sample, the sample 
excluding private targets, the sample excluding the US.  The data thus indicate that club 
deals are more likely to occur in countries with weak creditor rights. The economic 
significance is such that a 1-point decrease in creditor rights reduces the probability of a 
club deal by approximately 8%-14% depending on the specification and sample 
considered.  For the subsample of excluding private targets and US targets, creditor rights 
are still negative but marginally insignificant (t-statistic is 1.59).  This latter result is 
likely attributable to the large reduction in the number of observations for this subsample 
(only 337 observations, while the other subsamples have at least 608 observations and up 
to 2589 observations).  The data indicate that deal size are the most important driver for 
club deals.  The other legal indices are not significant in the regressions, with the sole 
exception of the common law dummy variable in the third regression; however, that 
effect is not robust in the other specifications. 
-- Table 7 About Here -- 
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In addition to the importance of creditor rights in influencing club deals, the data 
show a number of other significant variables in Table 7.  Most notably, deal size by itself 
contributes more than 15% to the adjusted R-square in all of the regressions. Club deals 
also tend to involve targets with lower multiples. For example, enterprise value/EBITDA 
is weakly negatively related to the likelihood for a deal to be club deal. This is consistent 
with extant evidence that PE sponsors collude in club deals to avoid competition for 
attractive targets (Officer et al., 2008). The cross-border dummy is negatively related to 
the probability for a target to be acquired in club LBO in both the full sample and non-US 
sub-sample. The data show that club deals are 19.4% more likely to take place among 
domestic PE sponsors for domestic targets in the subsample that excludes US targets, and 
up to 46.5% more likely in the full sample.  Note, however, that this effect is insignificant 
in the regression for the subsample of public and non-US targets, which again is likely 
attributable to the reduced sample size. 
Table 8 examines institutional factors that influence the decision of cross-border 
deals. The effect of creditor rights on cross-border LBOs depends on whether or not the 
US is included in the sample.  The creditor rights index is positively associated with the 
probability of a cross-border LBO with the US targets in the sample, but negatively 
associated with the probability of a cross-border LBO without the US targets in the 
sample.  More than 50% of the sample is comprised by US targets and non-US PE 
investors.  The attraction to the US is likely attributable to factors apart from creditor 
rights.  As such, we believe it is more meaningful to assess the effect of creditor rights on 
cross-border LBO deals with the non-US sample.  In the subsample that excludes US 
targets, a decrease in creditor rights by 1 increases the likelihood of a cross-border deal 
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by 15.9% with the sample of public and private firms, and 4.9% with the subsample of 
public firms, and these effects are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  In countries with poor creditor rights, it is for domestic PE funds to finance 
deals with external debt.  Therefore, deals are more likely to involve  foreign PE sponsors 
who can access more financing and at a cheaper rate from their home country.  Also, the 
data show that an increase in the antidirector rights index by 1 (i.e., an increase in 
shareholder rights) increases the probability of cross-border LBOs by 13.6% - 17.7%, and 
this result is statistically significant when both public and private firms are included in 
the sample, and regardless of the inclusion of US targets. Most PE sponsors are either 
based in the US or Europe so PE investment flows from these countries to countries with 
poorer investor protection. The results support our hypothesis that cross border LBOs can 
overcome the weak creditor protection in target country. Overall, the results in table 8 
support the notion discussed in section II that cross-border deals enable, at least in part, 
the benefits better investor protection from the home country to extend to foreign firms 
based in institutional environments with weak investor protection.   
-- Table 8 About Here -- 
Table 9 presents regressions that assess the impact of institutional factors on 
buyout pricing in terms of the LBO premium (the offer price divided by the stock price 
one day prior to the LBO announcement). As in the prior tables, the tests are conducted 
with and without US target firms. All of the regressions show that creditor rights have a 
significantly negative effect on LBO premiums regardless of the subsample considered.  
The economic significance is such that a 1-point increase in the creditor rights index 
reduces the premium by at least 1.5% (in the subsample of only public firms excluding 
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US targets) and by as much as 2.9% (in the sample of only public firms including US 
targets).  The findings confirm our prediction in section II that creditor protection helps to 
mitigate expropriation by PE investors and results in less wealth transfer to equity 
investors.  Antidirector rights are positively associated with LBO premiums in the first 
model, suggesting that shareholder’s wealth gain is greater in countries with better 
protection for equity investors, but this effect is not robust in the other models.  The LBO 
premium is also lower in the cross-border deals by 7.3%-8.9% and this effect is 
significant in all specifications in Table 9 except the second model.  Finally, countries 
with greater market capitalization also have lower premiums, indicating that larger 
markets offer more competitively priced deals. 
-- Table 9 About Here -- 
V. Conclusion 
This paper documents the LBO takeover activities around the world and examines 
the influence of institutional environment on the development of LBO markets. This 
context is important in the law and finance literature as it enables a stringent test of the 
Coasian proposition that sophisticated investors can find ways to alleviate the costs of 
inefficient legal institutions.  Large PE funds and the associated financial institutions 
involved in carrying out international LBOs are arguably very sophisticated. 
The data indicate LBOs are more active, but premiums are lower, in countries 
with stronger creditor rights. Better legal protection for creditors helps LBO sponsors to 
access external debt financing.  But more stringent protection for creditors also reduces 
premiums associated with LBOs as it mitigates expropriation by PE investors and results 
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in less wealth transfer to equity investors.  These findings hold for the non-US samples.  
The US is an outlier country with low creditor rights indices but active LBO investment.  
Formal institutions, such as protection for external financing via creditor rights, 
not only influence the LBO activity in general but also influence the sponsors’ decision 
on deal practices. We find that club deals are more likely to occur in countries with 
poorer creditor rights.  The premium difference between club and single-sponsored deals 
is larger in countries with poorer creditor rights.  Furthermore, the data indicate that 
cross-border deals are more likely to occur in countries with weaker creditor protection, 
and cross-border capital is sourced from PE sponsored in countries with stronger creditor 
rights. The results indicate that PE sponsors strategically arrange deals to mitigate the 
disadvantage of the credit financing constraint, and to take advantage of credit cross 
different creditor-protection regimes.  
Overall, the data highlight the sophistication of PE funds’ strategic choices in 
arranging club deals and international deals to mitigate the costs of inefficient legal 
protections for creditors.  But legal and institutional inefficiencies in creditor protection 
nevertheless still play an important impact on the development of LBO markets around 
the world, and impact the frequency, size and structure of LBO deals.  
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Appendix I: Definition of Key Institutional Variables related to Institutions and LBOs 
The table summarizes the definition of key institutional variables. The institutional 
variables include Legal Origin, GDP per Capita, Anti-director Rights Indices, Creditor 
Rights Indices, and Market-based Financial System. 
 
Institutional Variables Explanations 
Legal Origin  Equals one if the origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of the 
country is the English Common Law, and zero otherwise. Source: La 
Porta et al. (1998). 
GDP per Capita Gross national income per capita (source: World Development Indicators 
2005). 
Anti-director Rights 
Indices 
Formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares 
prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (3) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is 
allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for 
an extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 
percent the sample median, or (6) when shareholders have pre-emptive 
rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. The range for 
the index is from zero to six. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) and Spanman 
(2009) . 
Creditor Rights Indices An index aggregating creditor rights,. A score of one is assigned when 
each of the following rights of secured lenders are defined in laws and 
regulations: First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or 
minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, 
secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization 
petition is approved, i.e., there is no automatic stay or asset freeze. Third, 
secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a 
bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors such as government or 
workers. Finally, if management does not retain administration of its 
property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges 
from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is 
constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003.  Source: La 
Porta (1998) 
Market based Financial 
System  
Dummy that defines ccountries where the conglomerate ratio of banking 
sector development to stock market development is below the mean are 
classified as market-based, e.g., UK and US. Source: Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) 
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Appendix II: Institutional Environment Variables in Sample Countries  
This table displays the scores of each institutional variable for each country. The country will not 
enter some of the test later on if the variables are denoted as NA. The variables are obtained from 
Shleifer’s website at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset. The anti-director 
rights indices are updated by Spamann (2009). 
 
 Legal Origin (UK) Market-based Financial System Creditor Rights Anti-director Rights 
Australia 1 1 1 4 
Canada 1 1 1 5 
Hong Kong 1 1 4 5 
India 1 0 4 5 
Ireland 1 1 1 5 
Israel 1 0 4 4 
Malaysian 1 1 4 5 
New Zealand 1 1 3 4 
Pakistan 1 0 4 4 
Singapore 1 1 4 5 
South Africa 1 1 3 5 
Sri Lanka 1 0 3 4 
Thailand 1 1 3 4 
UK 1 1 4 5 
US 1 1 1 3 
Zimbabwe 1 0 4 4 
Argentina 0 0 1 2 
Belgium 0 0 2 3 
Brazil 0 1 1 5 
Chile 0 1 2 4 
Colombia 0 0 0 3 
France 0 0 0 3.5 
Greece 0 0 1 2 
Indonesia 0 0 4 4 
Italy 0 0 2 2 
Mexico 0 1 0 3 
Netherlands 0 0 2 2.5 
Peru 0 0 0 4.5 
Philippine 0 1 0 4 
Portugal 0 0 1 2.5 
Spain 0 0 2 5 
Turkey 0 0 2 3 
Venezuela 0 0 3 1 
Austria 0 0 3 2 
Germany 0 0 3 3.5 
Japan 0 1 2 4.5 
South Korea 0 1 3 4.5 
Switzerland 0 1 1 3 
Taiwan 0 1 2 3 
Denmark 0 0 3 4 
Finland 0 0 1 3.5 
Norway 0 0 2 3.5 
Sweden 0 1 2 3.5 
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Table 1: Year Distribution of LBOs  
 
The table presents the distribution of LBOs over sample period. The sample includes 2589 
worldwide LBOs (both private and public targets) from 1995 to 2007. The data is obtained from 
DEALOGIC and SDC. We exclude LBOs that have deal value less than $5 million or the 
financial acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. Columns 2 and 3 present the numbers of LBOs and 
average deal value of LBOs for each year. Columns 4 and 5 show the percentage of LBOs in total 
acquisitions in term of both numbers and total deal values. Columns 6 and 7 show the percentage 
of Club LBOs and cross-border LBOs in total LBOs. Column 8 reports the percentage of US 
LBOs in world LBOs in numbers. Column 9 shows the percentage of US LBO in total US 
acquisitions in numbers.  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year Number of LBOs 
Average 
LBO Deal 
Value ($ 
Million) 
LBO 
Percentage in 
total 
Takeovers 
LBO Value 
Percentage in 
total 
Takeovers 
CLUB LBO 
Deal 
Percentage in 
LBOs 
Cross-Boarder 
LBO 
Percentage in 
LBOs 
1995 66 225.35 2.81% 2.48% 12.82% 10.61% 
1996 71 279.71 7.59% 4.90% 26.09% 11.27% 
1997 99 290.10 11.81% 10.28% 7.79% 17.17% 
1998 124 237.91 11.57% 7.14% 14.56% 20.16% 
1999 140 353.57 14.11% 4.66% 21.31% 42.14% 
2000 171 296.71 11.74% 5.58% 17.27% 34.50% 
2001 176 289.69 11.52% 6.62% 25.00% 33.52% 
2002 241 392.52 14.53% 14.52% 22.53% 35.68% 
2003 309 399.20 23.90% 20.19% 21.49% 27.51% 
2004 539 412.58 21.63% 19.34% 19.30% 29.13% 
2005 491 545.31 21.20% 18.28% 15.00% 28.51% 
2006 648 991.35 25.77% 39.88% 16.64% 6.79% 
2007 242 626.72 25.93% 25.91% 11.17% 8.68% 
AVG 255  526.47 15.80% 13.83%  17.66% 23.12% 
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Table 2: Industry Distribution of LBOs.  
 
The table presents the industry distribution of LBOs over sample period. The sample includes 
2589 worldwide LBOs from 1995 to 2007. The data is obtained from DEALOGIC and SDC. We 
exclude LBOs that have deal value less than $5 million or the financial acquirer’s final stake less 
than 50%. The industry distributions are reported according to the descending order of frequency 
in LBO deal numbers. We report average deal value and average premiums for LBOs in each 
industry.  
 
Industry Sector Frequency in deal number (%) Deal Value Premium (%)  
Manufacturing 39.62 647.19 17.32 
Services 28.06 748.30 19.14 
Retails 11.61 1183.56 21.59 
Whole Sale 6.45 504.64 16.51 
Communications 3.87 2596.32 12.23 
Transportation 2.06 1751.21 14.07 
Electricity and Gas 1.91 2735.77 38.41 
Construction 1.67 839.31 9.43 
REITS 1.67 5625.16 13.74 
Mining & Agriculture 1.55 783.40 20.57 
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Table 3: Country Distribution of LBOs  
 
The table presents the country distribution of LBOs over sample period. The sample includes 
2589 worldwide LBOs from 1995 to 2007 over 49 countries. The data is obtained from 
DEALOGIC and SDC. We exclude LBOs that have deal value less than $5 million or the 
financial acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. Panel A reports the country distributions according 
to the descending order of frequency in LBO deal number and average deal value and average 
premium for each country. We only include the first 9 countries that have the most frequent LBO 
deals. Panel B reports the difference between countries with common law legal origin and those 
without common law origin. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A: 
Deal Country 
Frequency in 
number  
(%) 
Frequency in 
value  
(%) 
Deal Value 
(million USD)  Premium (%) 
USA 42.97 63.24 1141.57 25.62 
UK 18.52 16.59 769.72 11.76 
France 5.20 2.53 478.97 12.79 
Germany 4.84 1.63 348.49 9.04 
Canada 4.01 2.84 622.89 22.21 
Japan 3.92 1.15 206.81 9.95 
Australia 1.95 0.66 239.11 13.24 
Italy 1.94 0.43 366.10 2.22 
Denmark 1.37 2.98 1814.44 12.84 
Sweden 1.37 1.14 1112.79 21.06 
Others 13.91 6.81 646.78 13.36 
 
Panel B: 
Legal Origin 
Frequency in 
number  
(%) 
Frequency in 
value  
(%) 
Deal Value 
(billion USD)  Premium (%) 
Common Law 
Origin 64.88 69.13 1207.12 18.35 
Civil Law Origin 35.12 30.87 539.15 9.64 
P-value of 
Difference  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
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Table 4:  Summary Statistics of Target Firms and the Difference Cross Deal Types.  
 
The table includes 576 public-to-private transactions in the sample. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics of deal value, EBIDTA/sale, market to book ratio, and enterprise value/EBIDTA (all 
measured at the last twelve months before announcement date). Panel B reports the summary 
statistics of cross-sectional premiums for all LBOs, Club LBOs and US LBOs. Panel C reports 
the multiples and deal value between different legal origins, cross-border and domestic deals, and 
club and single-sponsored deals.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Key Financials of Targets  
 Mean Median SD 
 LBOs 
Deal Value ($ Million) 526.47 133.89 1668.01 
EBITDA/Sale (%) 21.03 11.08 269.16 
Market to Book Ratio  1.02 0.74 1.78 
Enterprise Value/EBITDA 14.37 10.37 23.34 
  US LBO 
Deal Value ($ Million) 1217.64 289.24  3514.48 
EBITDA/Sale (%) 7.85 10.64 58.06 
Market to Book Ratio  1.01  0.75 2.05 
Enterprise Value/EBITDA  13.27 10.42 12.01 
Panel B: Premium (Offer Price/Stock Price-1) 
 LBOs 
1 Day Prior to Announcement 17.25 13.98 30.48 
1 Month Prior to Announcement 28.19 22.28 45.95 
  US LBO 
1 Day Prior to Announcement 25.53 20.67 29.43 
1 Month Prior to Announcement 35.17 28.25 55.59 
 
Panel C: Comparison of LBOs cross Legal Origin and Deal Types   
 Enterprise 
Value/EBIDTA 
Deal Value 
(Million USD) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
LBOs in Countries with Common Law  14.57 10.44 560.95 140.00 
LBOs in Countries with Civil Law  13.87 9.87 462.70 123.02 
P-value of Difference 0.77 0.40 0.10* 0.01*** 
Cross board LBOs 10.97 8.09 497.31 162.50 
Domestic LBOs 15.02 10.67 535.25 122.14 
P-value of Difference 0.15 0.11 0.58 0.00*** 
Club LBOs 12.09 10.89 1260.59 402.15 
Single-sponsored LBOs 15.91 10.44 401.14 132.88 
P-value of Difference 0.17 0.19 0.00*** 0.00*** 
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Table 5: Creditor rights and LBO Premiums  
 
Panel A compares the creditor rights between acquiring country and target country. It includes all 
LBO deals. Panel B compares the premium between cross border deals and domestic deals. The 
premium is measured as offer price over price one day before the LBO announcement minus one. 
It includes public-to-private transactions only. Panel C compares the premium difference between 
club deals and single sponsored deals in countries grouped by their creditor rights.  The premium 
is measured with offer price over stock price one day before the LBO announcement. *, **, *** 
Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Premium comparison (Offer price / price one day before LBO announcement -1) 
 Mean Median 
Cross border 4.32 16.32 
Domestic deals 11.22 11.59 
t-statistics of the difference 1.88* 1.52 
 
Panel B: Creditor rights comparison 
 Exclude US Acquirer All cross-border deals 
Creditor rights of acquire 
country 2.86 2.22 
Creditor rights of target 
country  2.05 2.12 
t-statistics of the difference 8.44*** 1.13 
 
Panel C: Premium comparison (Offer price / price one day before LBO announcement -1) 
 Mean Median 
Club Deal 13.71 12.82 
Single-sponsored Deal 16.32 11.71 
t-statistics of the difference 0.12 0.68 
 
Panel D: Premium difference between club deal and single-sponsored deal  
 Countries with weak 
creditor rights 
exclude US (<2) 
US 
Countries with 
strong creditor 
rights (>=2) 
Club Deal 3.93 16.99 10.65 
Single-sponsored Deal 16.26 23.91 8.47 
t-statistics of the difference 2.19** 1.29 0.56 
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Table 6: Country-level LBO activity and creditor rights  
 
The table presents country-level regression results on institutional factors and LBO activities. The 
dependent variable takes log (value of all LBOs in the country), and its adjustment by the stock 
market capitalization and all takeover deal values of the country. The sample includes 2589 
worldwide LBOs from 1995 to 2007 and 33 countries. The data is obtained from DEALOGIC 
and SDC. We exclude LBOs that have deal value less than $5 million or the financial acquirer’s 
final stake less than 50%. The independent variables include country-specific institutional 
variables such as GDP per capita, antidirector rights indices, creditor rights indices, legal origin, 
market-based financial system dummy, and development of stock market (stock market 
capitalization/GDP in 1995). The heteroscedastic robust t-statistics are reported in the 
parenthesis. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Log (Total LBO Deal Volume 
Log(Total LBO Deal 
Volume/Market Cap) 
Intercept -7.065 (2.29) 
-0.224 
(2.23) 
Log(GDP per Capita) 1.045*** (3.38) 
0.007 
(0.45) 
Anti-director Rights Indices 0.051 (0.35) 
0.002 
(0.16) 
Creditor Rights Indices 0.321* (1.81) 
0.025* 
(1.76) 
Legal Origin (UK) -0.385 (0.37) 
0.005 
(1.15) 
Market based Financial System  0.094 (0.14) 
-0.049 
(1.57) 
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP 0.023 (0.03) 
-0.003 
(0.33) 
Obs. 33 33 
R2 0.67 0.55 
P value (F-Test)  0.00 0.03 
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Table 7: Choice of club LBOs 
 
The table presents results of probit regression on the choice of club deal LBOs relative to other 
LBOs. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which equals one if it is a club deal LBOs, 
and zero otherwise. The sample includes 2589 worldwide LBOs from 1995 to 2007. The data is 
obtained from DEALOGIC and SDC. We exclude LBOs that have deal value less than $5 million 
or the financial acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. The independent variables include deal 
characteristics (target size, Enterprise value/EBITDA, debt/asset ratio, and cross-border dummy) 
and country-specific institutional variables (logarithm of GDP per capita, anti-director rights 
indices, creditor rights indices, market based financial system dummy, and legal origin). The 
clustered regressions are on country level and regressions also control industry and year fixed 
effects. The heteroscedastic robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** 
Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dummy =1 if Club LBO, 0 if other LBO 
 
 
Full sample, 
include 
public and 
private 
targets 
Full 
sample, 
exclude 
private 
targets 
Include public 
and private 
targets, 
exclude US 
targets 
Exclude US 
targets, 
exclude 
private targets 
Log(Deal Value) 0.239*** (12.00) 
0.366*** 
(9.07) 
0.232*** 
(8.60) 
0.321*** 
(3.58) 
Enterprise 
Value/EBITDA  
-0.013* 
(1.80)  
-0.043 
(1.56) 
Debt/Asset  -0.313* (1.69)  
-0.974** 
(2.14) 
Target  
Characteristics 
Cross-boarder 
Deal Dummy 
-0.235* 
(2.88) 
-0.465* 
(1.90) 
-0.194** 
(2.51) 
-0.052 
(0.61) 
Logarithm of 
GDP per capita 
-0.144* 
(1.89) 
0.223 
(0.83) 
-0.035 
(0.44) 
0.035 
(0.93) 
Anti-director 
Rights Indices 
0.008 
(1.46) 
0.060 
(0.67) 
-0.050 
(0.90) 
0.033 
(0.45) 
Creditor Rights 
Indices 
-0.102* 
(1.86) 
-0.141* 
(1.75) 
-0.083** 
(2.10) 
-0.092 
(1.59) 
Market-based 
Financial System  
-0.163 
(1.42) 
-0.077 
(1.10) 
-0.173 
(1.19) 
-0.330 
(0.59) 
 
Target 
Country 
Institutional  
Factors 
Common Law 
(UK legal origin) 
0.188 
(1.61) 
0.160 
(1.31) 
0.266** 
(2.19) 
0.364 
(1.35) 
 Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Obs. 2589 608 1621 337 
 Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.12 
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Table 8: Choice of cross-border LBOs 
 
The table presents results of probit regression on the choice of cross-border LBOs relative to 
domestic deals. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the LBOs fund 
is from a country different from the target, 0 otherwise. The sample includes 2589 worldwide 
LBOs from 1995 to 2007. The data is obtained from DEALOGIC and SDC. We exclude LBOs 
that have deal value less than $5 million or the financial acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. The 
independent variables include deal characteristics (target size, market book ratio, operating 
performance and debt ratio) and country-specific institutional variables (logarithm of GDP per 
capita, anti-director rights indices, creditor rights indices, market based financial system dummy, 
legal origin and contracting standard). The clustered regressions are on country level and 
regressions also control industry and year fixed effects. The heteroscedastic robust t-statistics are 
reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dummy =1 if Cross border LBO deal,  0 if other LBO 
 
 
Full sample, 
include 
public and 
private 
targets 
Full 
Sample, 
exclude 
private 
targets 
Include 
public and 
private 
targets, 
exclude US 
targets 
Exclude US 
targets, 
exclude 
private 
targets 
Log(Deal Value) 0.040 (0.15) 
-0.005 
(0.78) 
0.119*** 
(4.19) 
0.040 
(0.47) 
Enterprise 
Value/EBITDA  
-0.015 
(1.47)  
-0.029** 
(2.23) 
Target  
Characteristics 
Debt/Asset  0.245** (2.21)  
0.074 
(1.54) 
Logarithm of 
GDP per capita 
-0.073 
(0.33) 
-0.179 
(1.13) 
-0.138 
(1.38) 
-0.021 
(0.07) 
Anti-director 
Rights Indices 
-0.136* 
(1.98) 
-0.127 
(0.67) 
-0.177*** 
(2.56) 
-0.077 
(0.86) 
Creditor Rights 
Indices 
0.186** 
(2.13) 
0.179*** 
(4.43) 
-0.159*** 
(2.70) 
-0.049* 
(1.68) 
Market-based 
Financial System  
-0.199 
(0.83) 
-0.465 
(1.41) 
-0.015 
(1.13) 
-0.394* 
(1.87) 
 
Target 
Country 
Institutional  
Factors 
Common Law 
(UK legal origin) 
-0.261 
(1.07) 
-0.102 
(0.87) 
0.086 
(0.67) 
0.349 
(0.65) 
 Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Obs. 2589 608 1621 337 
 Pseudo R2 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.09 
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Table 9: Multivariate Analysis on Takeover Premium of LBOs  
The table presents results of determinants of LBO premiums.   
Premium = α0 + α1 · Creditor Rights + α2 · Control Variables + ε, 
The dependent variable is the takeover premium (calculated as offer price/stock price at 1 day 
prior to announcement day or 1 month prior to announcement day). The independent variables 
include deal characteristics (target deal value or market capitalization, debt ratio, market to book 
ratio, enterprise value/EBITDA, club LBO dummy and cross-border deal dummy) and country-
specific institution variables (anti-director rights indices and creditor rights indices). The sample 
includes 576 worldwide LBOs (public targets) from 1995 to 2007. The data is obtained from 
DEALOGIC and SDC. We exclude LBOs that have deal value less than $5 million or the 
financial acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. The clustered regressions are on country level and 
regressions also control industry and year fixed effects. The heteroscedastic robust t-statistics are 
reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Offer Price/Stock Price at 1 Day  Prior to Announcement - 1 
 Full Sample Exclude US target firms 
 1 2 3 4 
Log(Deal Value) -0.025** (2.07)  
-0.017** 
(2.02)  
Log(Market Capitalization)  -0.032** (2.50)  
-0.027* 
(1.90) 
Target Debt Ratio  0.076 (1.32)  
0.065 
(1.39) 
Target Market to Book Ratio  -0.014 (0.82)  
-0.007 
(0.49) 
Enterprise Value/EBITDA  0.001 (0.88)  
0.001 
(0.81) 
Club LBO Dummy -0.032 (1.30) 
0.017 
(0.74) 
0.034 
(0.38) 
0.004 
(0.39) 
Cross-boarder Dummy -0.078* (1.94) 
-0.053 
(1.33) 
-0.089*** 
(2.95) 
-0.073* 
(1.76) 
Anti-director Rights  0.026*** (2.86) 
0.015 
(1.20) 
0.009 
(0.90) 
0.018 
(1.36) 
Creditor Rights  -0.027*** (3.26) 
-0.029*** 
(2.85) 
-0.019** 
(2.37) 
-0.015*** 
(3.83) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 455 338 248 114 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.15 0.52 0.25 
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Figure 1: Average Year Premiums of LBOs and other Takeovers Average 
   
The sample includes 576 LBOs around the world and 4461 other takeovers from 1995 to 2007. 
The data is obtained from DEALOGIC and SDC. We exclude takeovers that involve private 
targets, divisions of public companies, deal value less than $10 million, deals with no premium 
data reported or acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. We include additional data of LBOs and 
other takeovers between 1985 and 1994 from Thompson Financials. This figure reports the 
average year premiums of LBOs and other takeovers from 1985 to June 2007. The premium is 
calculated at one day pre-announcement. The dash line represents LBOs. The solid line presents 
M&As.  
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Figure 2: LBO Premium Distribution According to Deal Value Quintiles 
 
The figure depicts the mean premiums of LBOs and other takeovers for both worldwide and US 
sample. The sample includes 576 worldwide LBOs and 4461 other takeovers from 1995 to 2007. 
The data is obtained from DEALOGIC and SDC. We exclude takeovers that involve private 
targets, divisions of public companies, deal value less than $10 million, deals with no premium 
data reported or acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. We first divide deal values for both LBOs 
and other takeovers into four quintiles and then calculate the cross-sectional means of premiums 
according to the four quintiles in deals values.  
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